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The Digambara Jainas have a special idea of the way in which a Jina teaches.1  
Jaini (1979: 4) describes as follows: 
 
Upon attainment of Jinahood, he enters the state of kevalajñāna, from 
which there can be no falling away. At this point all normal bodily 
activities — eating, sleeping, talking, and so on — come to an end; the 
Jina sits, absolutely unmoving, in his omniscient state. And yet, as he sits 
there, a miraculous sound (divyadhvani) will be heard emanating from his 
body. Several gaṇadharas (supporters of the order) will then appear. Each 
will possess the ability to interpret the divyadhvani and thus to convey the 
Jina’s teachings to others, answering accurately all questions pertaining to 
his path and doctrine. 
 
Elsewhere in his book (p. 42), Jaini states: 
 
Whereas Digambaras imagine the divyadhvani as a monotone — like the 
sound oṃ — which only the gaṇadharas are able to comprehend, 
Śvetāmbaras suggest that the Jina speaks in a human language that is 
divine in the sense that men of all regions, and animals, can benefit from 
hearing it.2 
 
Paul Dundas's handbook The Jains does not say much about the divine sound. All 
I found is this (Dundas 2002: 37): 
                                                
1 Not all liberated saints. Jaini (1979: 259-260) observes: "there is no textual evidence 
that the Jainas ever tried to set the Tīrthaṅkaras apart [from other arhats]. Indeed, 
absolute omniscience is in their tradition the fundamental criterion for liberation; thus it 
would have made no sense for the ācāryas to have spoken of an arhat who was ‘not 
omniscient’ or who was somehow ‘less omniscient’ than the teacher-Jina. The only 
differences between arhats and Tīrthaṅkaras, therefore, were of a worldly (hence not 
ultimately significant) nature; although the teacher possessed certain miraculous powers, 
especially the divyadhvani, the quality of his enlightenment was in no way superior." 
2 In a footnote Jaini explains (p. 42-43, n. 3): "The Śvetāmbara scriptures maintain that 
Mahāvīra spoke Ardhamāgadhī, a Prakrit dialect of Magadha: bhagavā ca ṇaṃ 
Addhamāgahīe bhāsāe āikkhai, sā vi ya ṇaṃ Addhamāgahī bhāsijjamāṇī tesiṃ savvesiṃ 
āriyamaṇāriyāṇaṃ appaṇo hiyasivasuhayabhāsattāe pariṇamai ... [Samavāya-sūtra 
(Suttāgame edition)] § 111. The Digambaras seem to have similar views on the nature of 
this "language": "yojanāntaradūrasamīpasthāṣṭādaśabhāṣāsaptaśatakubhāṣā-
yutatiryagdevamanuṣyabhāṣākāra ... vāgatiśayasampannaḥ ... Mahāvīro 'rthakartā." 
[Jinendra, Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa] II. 431 (quoted from Dhavalā)." 
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The Digambara sect explains Mahāvīra's unwillingness to preach at [the 
first samavasaraṇa] not as the result of the absence of human beings but, 
more specifically, because of the lack of disciples (gaṇadhara), whose 
function is to interpret and mediate to other people the divine sound 
(divyadhvani) which the Digambaras claim emanates from Mahāvīra's 
body when he preaches and which would otherwise be unintelligible. 
 
This much agrees with what we have learned from Jaini. However, Dundas says 
more about the divine sound in an article (“Jain attitudes towards the Sanskrit 
language”) where he mentions it under the general heading “A Jain Root 
Language?” (Dundas 1996: 141). What he says here is different: 
 
The Digambara Jain approach is more complex [than the Śvetāmbara one]. 
There is agreement that a ‘divine sound’ (divyadhvani) flows from the 
body of the tīrthaṅkara when he is preaching, but a whole range of 
disparate views came into play in the course of Digambara history as to 
whether this emerges from his mouth or is constituted by syllables or not. 
The divyadhvani is also sometimes described as containing within itself all 
tongues, most specifically the 18 major and 170 minor languages of India. 
One source, the Mahāpurāṇa, states that it is naturally one language, while 
another, the Darśanaprābhṛta, claims that it half consists of Ardhamāgadhī 
and half of all other languages. A medieval commentator on the 
Darśanaprābhṛta goes so far as to claim that the gods receive the 
divyadhvani in the form of Sanskrit … 
 
Dundas, like Jaini, gives no direct textual references, but refers on p. 141, again 
like Jaini, to the Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa ([II] 429-432). 
 Clearly what Jaini and Dundas tell us about the divyadhvani of the 
Digambaras is not quite the same. For Jaini it is a monotone, for Dundas it takes 
many different forms, including linguistic forms. Yet both base themselves 
primarily on the same source, the encyclopedia called Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa, 
and the texts it refers to. 
 Neither Jaini nor Dundas say much about the reason why the Digambara 
Jainas came to believe that a tīrthaṅkara does not preach in ordinary language, 
but rather through a divine sound that must subsequently be interpreted. Nor have 
I found much in terms of a discussion on this topic elsewhere in the secondary 
literature.3 The closest to an explanation is no doubt the observation that “[an 
omniscient Jina] engages in no worldly activity and no bodily functions (eating 
meals, for example), since these are considered antithetical to omniscient 
cognition. He ‘preaches’ by means of a magical ‘divine sound’.” (Jaini 1979: 39). 
                                                
3 McEvilley (2002: 202) makes a comparison with Orpheus: “It is interesting, perhaps 
mere coincidence but perhaps not, that in Jain tradition the Jina ‘“preaches” by means of 
a magical “divine sound”’.” Kabay (2013) comes up with a philosophical interpretation, 
suggesting that “the divyadhvani is … the ‘sound’ of silence” (p. 188); this, according to 
him, agrees with the fact that Mahāvīra was a trivialist, “someone who believes every 
proposition to be true” (p. 189 n. 4). 
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 In this paper I will try to understand what led different Digambara authors 
to adopt their at times peculiar views as to the ways the Jina preached, taking into 
consideration the intellectual context in which they lived and worked. 
 I will begin with Kundakunda, one of the earliest and most important 
Digambara thinkers (his precise date remains uncertain). His Pravacanasāra 
contains the following verse (in the translation of its editor, A. N. Upadhye): 
 
In the case of Arahantas, at the time of their Arhatship, (certain activities 
like) standing, sitting, moving about and religious discourse are natural 
(and necessary consequences of the Karmic fruitition with no effort on 
their part), just as acting deceitfully is in the case of women.4 
 
Clearly, in Kundakunda's opinion, a liberated saint is not "absolutely unmoving", 
as Jaini claimed. Moreover, there is no suggestion in this verse that religious 
teaching takes the form of a divine sound.5 
 The commentator Amṛtacandra (10th century CE) explains the verse as 
follows: 
 
Just as women, without any effort on their part, will engage in behavior 
that is characterized by deceit, because it is their nature since they have 
that kind of aptitude, so omniscient saints (kevalin), without any effort on 
their part, will engage in standing, sitting, walking about and religious 
teaching, because they have that kind of aptitude. And there is no 
contradiction here, as can be seen from the example of a cloud. Just as 
matter that has taken the form of a cloud is observed to engage in activities 
such as moving, being stationary, thundering and raining without any 
human effort, so omniscient saints are observed to engage in standing and 
so one without any mental activity on their part. For this reason, since they 
do not follow the arising of delusion, the standing etc. of omniscient saints, 
even though they are specific activities, do not bring about bondage, which 
is the normal effect of activity.6 
 
                                                
4 Kundakunda, Pravacanasāra 1.44: ṭhāṇaṇisejjavihārā dhammuvadeso ya ṇiyadayo 
tesiṃ/ arahaṃtāṇaṃ kāle māyācāro vva itthīṇaṃ. 
5 Interestingly, the Jaina Siddhānta Kośa quotes a line from a commentary 
(Tātparyavṛtti) on another work (Niyamasāra) attributed to Kundakunda, which does 
mention the divine sound: kevalimukhāravindavinirgato divyadhvaniḥ. 
6 Amṛtacandra on Pravacanasāra 1.44; ed. Upadhye p. 51-52: yathā hi mahilānāṃ 
prayatnam antareṇāpi tathāvidhayogyatāsadbhāvāt svabhāvabhūta eva 
māyopaguṇṭhanāguṇṭhito vyavahāraḥ pravartate, tathā hi kevalināṃ prayatnam 
antareṇāpi tathāvidhayogyatāsadbhāvāt sthānam āsanaṃ viharaṇaṃ dharmadeśanā ca 
svabhāvabhūtā eva pravartate/ api cāviruddham etad ambhodharadṛṣṭāntāt/ yathā khalv 
ambhodharākārapariṇatānāṃ pudgalānāṃ gamanam avasthānaṃ garjanam ambuvarṣaṃ 
ca puruṣaprayatnam antareṇāpi dṛśyante, tathā kevalināṃ sthānādayo 'buddhipūrvakā 
eva dṛśyante/ ato 'amī sthānādayo mohodayapūrvakatvābhāvāt kriyāviśeṣā api kevalināṃ 
kriyāphalabhūtabandhasādhanāni na bhavanti// 
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Amṛtacandra states in so many words that religious teaching, also in the case of a 
liberated saint, is a specific activity (kriyāviśeṣa), be it one without karmic 
consequences.7 What is more, he does not mention the divine sound. 
 Jayasena, another commentator on this text who may belong to the 12th 
century CE, does not deviate from Amṛtacandra in any essential respect. He 
follows his two predecessors in looking upon religious teaching as a form of 
activity, and does not mention the divine sound.8 
 What these commentaries do emphasize is that the religious teaching of a 
liberated saint is done without effort and without mental activity. This is a 
recurring theme in many texts, and one that makes sense if we situate Jaina 
thought in its intellectual context. Let us have a closer look at that context. 
 The ideological and religious movement that became most important in 
classical India, and with which Jainism had to come to terms, is Brahmanism. 
Brahmanism derived some of its claims to eminence from the fact that Brahmins 
knew and preserved the Veda and the language of the Veda, Sanskrit. From the 
point of view of the Brahmins, Sanskrit was not a language but rather the only 
correct language, all other languages being corruptions of Sanskrit. The relation 
between Sanskrit and reality was also close, a presumed fact that explained the 
efficacy of mantras (which are in Sanskrit). The reliability of the Veda, 
furthermore, is directly related to the fact that it is in Sanskrit. As a matter of fact, 
the Veda is a pure expression of the Sanskrit language, in the formation of which 
no authors played a role. The possession of this unique literary document gave 
Brahmanism the authority it claimed. From the Brahmanical point of view, the 
literary traditions of other currents of thought could not but be inferior, because 
they had nothing like the Veda. 
 This was the intellectual challenge with which Buddhism and Jainism 
were confronted, especially during the early centuries of the Common Era. Their 
sacred scriptures had not been composed in a language that could claim superior 
status and close correspondence to reality, and their sacred scriptures came, 
directly or indirectly, from the mouths of the founders of these religious 
movements. Let us first consider the languages of these sacred scriptures. 
 In a world in which Brahmanical ideology was gaining in importance, the 
temptation was great — both among Buddhists and Jainas — to make claims 
similar to those of Sanskrit about the languages of their own traditions. Both gave 
in to this temptation. Those Buddhists whose sacred scriptures were in what we 
call Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit claimed that Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit was a form 
of Vedic Sanskrit, governed by the Vedic rules of Pāṇini’s grammar. Those 
whose sacred scriptures had been preserved in Pali came to claim that Pali is the 
                                                
7 The same might be said about the only phrase from Akalaṅka's Tattvārthavārttika — 
also known as Rājavārttika — (I p. 132, l. 7-8) that is cited in this connection by the 
Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa. It reads: "... he in whom absolute knowledge has arisen as a 
result of the destruction of all veils of knowledge and who has turned into a speaker only 
on account of the activation of his tongue teaches all things that are the objects of hearing 
..." (... sakalajñānāvaraṇasaṃkṣayāvirbhūtātīndriyakevalajñānaḥ 
rasanopaṣṭambhamātrād eva vaktṛtvena pariṇataḥ sakalān śrutaviṣayān arthān upadiśati 
...). This passage clearly states that an omniscient saint uses his tongue in order to teach, 
not that a divine sound emanates from him. 
8 Jayasena on Pravacanasāra 1.44; ed. Upadhye p. 51-52. 
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root language of all living beings, the natural form of expression. The Śvetāmbara 
Jainas, for their part, made similar claims about Ardha-Māgadhī, the language in 
which Mahāvīra had preached. In other words, all these movements claimed that 
the language of their sacred scriptures was as good as, if not better than, 
Sanskrit.9 This solved the problem of language. 
 It did not solve all problems. There were further difficulties, and it would 
seem that the Digambara Jainas took these very much to heart. Consider the 
following. The classical school of Vedic interpretation, Mīmāṃsā, emphasized 
the special character of the language of the Veda, i.e. Sanskrit, but not only that. 
It also laid much stress on the fact that the Veda is pure because no mental 
activity, whether thought or desire, interferes with it. The rules of interpretation it 
developed were all based on one simple principle: that interpretation of a 
particular statement or word is correct which is closest to the text, and therefore 
least affected by the thoughts and ideas of the interpreter. The role of the mind 
must be reduced to the extent possible, preferably to zero. This principle applies 
to the interpretation of the Veda, but also to its composition. The purity of the 
Veda is guaranteed by the fact that no mental activity was involved in its 
composition. This in its turn was possible because the Veda had not been 
composed: it is eternal and has no author. Clearly the Buddhists and the Jainas 
could not claim that their sacred scriptures had not been composed. Their sacred 
scriptures were or represented the words uttered by their respective founders, i.e. 
the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Mental activity therefore did appear to play a role in 
their composition. 
 We have already seen that the texts we have considered do not agree with 
this conclusion. Both Amṛtacandra and Jayasena state in so many words that no 
mental activity is involved in Mahāvīra's teaching, and also Kundakunda's 
remarks seem to imply this. This teaching is therefore not polluted by the 
interference of a mind, just like the Veda, which owed its purity to this fact. 
 Omniscient saints have perfect knowledge, which affects the soul directly, 
without the interference of a mind, and also without the interference of the sense 
organs. This last fact is emphasized in the following passage from Siddhasena 
Mahāmati's Nyāyāvatāra with Siddharṣi's Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti thereon:10 
 
Wishing to explain the characteristics of omniscience, and with the 
purpose of eradicating the opinions of those who do not accept a highest 
form of knowledge, omniscience, that covers all things and is obtained 
through the destruction of all veils of karma, he states: 
                                                
9 See Bronkhorst 2011: 142-153 (§ 3.4). 
10 Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti p. 420-421 (§ 27.0-1), ed. Balcerowicz: yaiḥ pāramārthikaṃ 
samastāvaraṇavicchedalabhyam aśeṣārthagocaraṃ kevalajñānaṃ nābhyupagamyate, 
tanmatoddalanārthaṃ tallakṣaṇam abhidhitsur āha: 
sakalāvaraṇamuktātma kevalaṃ yat prakāśate/ 
pratyakṣaṃ sakalārthātmasatatapratibhāsanam// 
... 
asya ca pāramārthikatvaṃ, nirupacaritaśabdārthopapatteḥ/ tathā hy akṣaśabdo 
jīvaparyāyas, tataś cākṣaṃ prati vartate iti pratyakṣaṃ, yatrātmanaḥ sākṣād vyāpāraḥ/ 
vyāvahārikaṃ punar indriyavyavahitātmavyāpārasampādyatvāt paramārthataḥ parokṣam 
eva, dhūmād agnijñānavat tirodhānāviśeṣāt/. 
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That which shines forth as something perfect, freed from all veils, 
that is the highest perception, the uninterrupted presentation of the 
essence of all things. (27) 
... 
This highest perception is ultimate, because the word ‘perception’ 
(pratyakṣa) can be taken literally, as follows: the word akṣa is a synonym 
of ‘soul’; that which acts on the soul is prati-akṣa (> pratyakṣa). Here the 
soul is directly active. Everyday perception, on the other hand, is 
ultimately indirect, because it is produced by the activity of the soul that is 
separated from external reality by the sense organs, just like knowledge of 
fire that is derived from smoke, because in both cases the object of 
knowledge is hidden. 
 
Passages like the above show that the religious instruction provided by Mahāvīra 
is as pure and impersonal as the Veda. It is free from the interference of any 
mind, and was formulated in the original language, the one that is closest to 
reality. So far the perfect nature of the teaching of Jainism is guaranteed without 
the need for a divine sound. 
 So far, so good. However, another difficulty made its appearance. The 
reflection on language in India underwent certain developments that moved it 
away from earlier positions. The Buddhists were perhaps the first to maintain that 
language plays a role in hiding the true nature of the world from us, and in 
providing us with a world of appearances only. This began with the dharma-
theory initially elaborated in northwestern India during the final centuries 
preceding the Common Era. This theory admitted the existence of ultimate 
constituents of reality called dharmas, but not of the commonsense objects that 
are composed of these and that fill our daily lives. These commonsense objects, it 
was stated, are nothing but words: King Milinda — in the Milindapañha — is told 
in clear terms that his chariot is no more than a word, that in reality there is no 
chariot. Later Buddhists developed this vision, some of them coming to the 
conclusion that not even the dharmas exist: the world is empty (śūnya) and 
contains nothing that really exists. The reason we believe in the existence of our 
commonsense world is that we are misled by language. 
 The idea that language represents a world that is not ultimately real did not 
initially have much appeal to Brahmanical thinkers. That, however, changed. 
Bhartṛhari borrowed the idea of a phenomenal world that corresponds to language 
from the Buddhists, but developed a different vision as to the ultimate reality that 
hides behind words. To cite one of his verses:11 
 
What the seers see and what is established in [the highest] reality, is not 
expressed in language, it is not based on words. 
 
Also the early Advaita-Vedāntins, among them prominently Śaṅkara, adopted the 
view that language hides rather than reveals the true nature of reality. Indeed, a 
number of thinkers both Buddhist and Brahmanical drew attention to the fact that 
                                                
11 Vkp 2.139: ṛṣīṇāṃ darśanaṃ yac ca tattve kiṃcid avasthitam/ na tena vyavahāro 'sti na 
tac chabdanibandhanam// 
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many correct statements are self-contradictory. The Buddhist Nāgārjuna may 
have been the first to do so, but many Brahmanical thinkers followed.12 
 Jainism did not share these views. It did however distinguish, as we have 
seen, between two kinds of knowledge, direct (pratyakṣa) and indirect (parokṣa). 
Interestingly, they did not accept that sense-perception gives rise to direct 
knowledge. Direct knowledge is only available to liberated souls, and arises as a 
matter of fact directly in the soul, without the intermediary of sense organs or 
anything else. This direct knowledge, which is omniscience, is the kevala-jñāna 
that characterizes Mahāvīra and other liberated souls. 
 For those who are not liberated, there are only standpoints (naya), various 
incomplete ways to arrive at imperfect knowledge. Some of these nayas are 
linked to words, and like the other nayas, they do not provide perfect knowledge. 
The following passage from Siddharṣi's Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti first presents a 
defence of the word-related standpoints as satisfactory means of knowledge, 
before rejecting them:13 
 
Now the standpoints that are capable of considering words will be 
described. All three — called ‘word’ etc. — have a common intention, 
namely, that the word is the highest thing, not the meaning, because the 
latter is not different from the former. 
If you raise the question how the two can be non-different, given that it is 
established that there separateness is reall, we answer: their identity is 
based on a means of valid cognition (viz. inference), as follows: (i) The 
meaning is not different from the word, (ii) because the meaning is 
cognized when the word has been cognized. (iii) Something that is 
cognized when something else has been cognized is not different from that 
something else, as for example the own form of a word, that is cognized 
when the word is being cognized, its own form is cognized. (iv) When a 
                                                
12 See Bronkhorst 2011a. 
13 Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti p. 449-450 (§ 29.18), ed. Balcerowicz: adhunā 
śabdavicāracaturāṇām [matam] upavarṇyate/ tatra trayāṇām api śabdādīnām idaṃ 
sādhāraṇam ākūtaṃ, yad uta śabda eva paramārtho nārthas, tasya tadavyatiriktatvāt/ 
pārthakyena vastutvasiddheḥ katham avyatireka iti cet, pramāṇād iti brūmaḥ/ tathā hi: na 
vyatirikto 'rthaḥ śabdāt, tatpratītau tasya pratīyamānatvād, iha yatpratītau yat pratīyate 
tat tato 'vyatiriktaṃ bhavati, tad yathā: śabde pratīyamāne tasyaiva svarūpaṃ, pratīyate 
ca śabde pratīyamāne 'rtho, 'to 'sau tato 'vyatirikta iti/ agṛhītasaṅketasya 
ghaṭaśabdaśravaṇe 'pi ghaṭapratīter abhāvād vyatirikta iti ced, evaṃ tarhi viṣasya 
māraṇātmakatvaṃ tadajñasya na pratibhātīti tat tato vyatiriktam āpadyeta, na caitad asti, 
tadvyatirekāviśeṣeṇa guḍakhaṇḍavad viṣasyāpy amārakatvāpatteḥ ..., tan 
nābuddhapramātṛdoṣeṇa vastuno 'nyathātvam, anyathāndho rūpaṃ nekṣata iti tadabhāvo 
'pi pratipattavya iti/ ye nirabhidhānā vartante 'rthās teṣāṃ śabdāt pārthakyena 
vastutvasiddhir iti cen, na, nirabhidhānārthābhāvāt, kevalaṃ kecid viśeṣaśabdaiḥ 
saṅkīrtyante, kecit sāmānyadhvanibhir ity etāvān viśeṣaḥ syāt/ yadi vā sakalārthavācakā 
viśeṣadhvanayo na santīti nāsty atra pramāṇam/ tataś ca sarve 'rthā 
vidyamānasvavācakā arthatvād, ghaṭārthavad iti pramāṇāt sarveṣāṃ svavācakatvena ... 
śabdād apārthakyasiddhiḥ/ tasmān na paramārthato 'rthaḥ śabdātirikto 'sty, upacārataḥ 
punar laukikair aparyālocitaparamārthair vyavahriyate/ asāv aupacārikaḥ śabdātmako 
vārthaḥ pratikṣaṇabhaṅguraḥ svīkartavyo, varṇānāṃ kṣaṇadhvaṃsitāpratīte[ḥ]. 
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word is being cognized, its meaning is cognized. (v) It follows that the 
latter is not different from the former.14 
If you object that the meaning is different from its word, because someone 
who has not learned the convention (that links a pot to the word ‘pot’) does 
not cognize a pot even when he hears the word ‘pot’, we respond: Since an 
ignorant person is not aware of the killing power of poison, poison and its 
killing power would be different. This is not however the case, for it would 
follow that poison does not kill, like a piece of molasses which is also 
different from killing power ... A thing does not become different through 
the shortcoming of a knower who is not properly informed. If it were 
otherwise, one would have to accept the absence of color because a blind 
person cannot see it. 
If you object that the reality of things without designations, quite apart 
from words that might refer to them, has been established, this cannot be 
accepted, because there are not things without designations. The only 
distinction is that some are named by means of specific words, and others 
by means of general sounds. Alternatively, there is no proof that there are 
no specific sounds that are expressive of all meanings. All meanings have 
words that refer to them, because they are meanings, just like the meaning 
‘pot’.15 On the basis of this means of valid cognition it is established that 
meaning is not different from the word, because all meanings refer to 
themselves ... It follows that meaning is ultimately not different from the 
word, but it is metaphorically spoken about in this manner by common 
people who do not reflect upon highest reality. This object, whether it be 
metaphorical or constituted of words, must be accepted as being 
momentary, because speech sounds are cognized as disappearing in a 
moment ... 
 
This position is rejected in the following passage:16 
                                                
14 Points (i)-(v) follow the traditional pattern of a logical inference. 
15 Note that the word for ‘meaning’, artha, can also mean ‘thing’, and that the argument 
leans to some extent on this ambiguity. 
16 Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti p. 470-471 (§ 29.27), ed. Balcerowicz: tathā śabdādayo 'pi 
sarvathā śabdāvyatirekam arthasya samarthayanto durnayās, tatsamarthanārtham 
upanyastasya tatpratītau praīyamānatvalakṣaṇasya hetor anaikāntikatvāt/ tathā hi: 
nāyam ekānto yatpratītau yat pratīyate tat tato 'vyatiriktam eva, vyatiriktasyāpi 
pāvakāder anyathānupapannatvalakṣaṇasambandhabalād dhūmādipratītau 
pratīyamānatvāt/ evaṃ śabdo 'pi vyatiriktam apy arthaṃ vācakatvāt pratyāyayiṣyaty, 
avyatiriktasya pratyakṣādibādhitatvāc, chabdād vivekenaivānubhūyamānatvāt/ asmiṃś ca 
hetāv anaikāntike sthite sarvārthānāṃ sasvavācakatvasādhanadvāreṇa 
śabdāvyatirekasādhanam api dūrāpāstam eva/ na cātrāpi pratibandhagrāhi pramāṇaṃ — 
yo yo 'rthas tene tena sasvavācakena bhavitavyaṃ — ghaṭādidṛṣṭāntamātrāt tadasiddheḥ, 
kṣaṇikālakṣyadravyavivartānāṃ saṅketagrahaṇopāyābhāvenābhilapitum 
aśakyatayānabhilāpyatvasiddheś ca/ .../ tathā pratyekamatāpekṣayāpi svābhipretaṃ 
pratiṣṭḥāpayantas tadviparītaṃ śabdārthaṃ tiraskurvāṇā durnayatām ātmasātkurvanti/ 
etāvad dhi pramāṇapratiṣṭhitaṃ, yad uta vidhimukhena śabdo 'rthasya vācaka iti; na 
punar ayaṃ niyamo yathāyam asaiva vācako nānyasya, 
deśakālapuruṣasaṅketādivicitratayā sarvaśabdānām 
aparāparārthapratipādakatvenopalabdher 
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Also the standpoints of words etc., that support the complete non-
difference of word and meaning, are defective standpoints, because the 
ground adduced to prove them — namely, that when that (i.e. the word) 
has been cognized, this (i.e. the meaning) is cognized — is inconclusive. 
Consider the following: There is no invariable rule of the form "the fact 
that when one thing has been cognized something else is cognized implies 
that the former is non-different from the latter"; for when smoke etc. have 
been cognized, fire etc., though different, are cognized by force of the fact 
that both are connected through not being otherwise explainable. In the 
same way also a word makes its meaning known, even though the latter is 
different from the former, this because the word is expressive of its 
meaning; for a meaning non-different from the word is in conflict with 
perception etc., because the meaning is experienced as being different 
from the word. And once this ground has been established as being 
inconclusive, also the proof of the non-difference of the meaning from the 
word on account of the proof that all meanings presumably have words 
that express them has been discarded. There is no means to establish the 
connection "every meaning must have a word that expresses it", because it 
cannot be established on the mere example of a pot etc., and because it is 
established that momentary and invisible modifications of substances 
cannot be expressed in words, because it is not possible to express them 
since there is no means to grasp the convention (that supposedly links 
those modifications to words). ... The standpoints of words etc., inasmuch 
as they posit what is intended by each speaker with reference to his own 
opinion and conceal word meanings that are opposed to that, are defective 
standpoints. For this much has been established by means of valid 
cognition, that a word is positively expressive of a meaning. There is no 
limitation of the form that this word is expressive of that meaning only, 
not of any other meaning, because we observe that all words can make 
known many different meanings on account of the variety of place, time, 
persons, conventions etc., and because they can denote many different 
meanings on account of having the aptitude to do so since they have 
endless characteristics; meanings, too, have endless characteristics, so that 
nothing opposes them being denoted by many different words. We do 
indeed see that words are used in this manner without discord. If one were 
not to accept this, the use of words would collapse. It follows that all 
sounds have the aptitude to express all meanings. However, they somehow 
produce cognition only with reference to certain meanings, depending on 
the partial annihilation and subsidence of karma, etc. ... These standpoints 
called "word" etc. are therefore real standpoints when they show the 
                                                                                                                                      
anantadharmatayāparāparayogyatādvāreṇāparāparārthābhidhāyakatvopapatter, 
arthānām apy ananadharmatvād evāparāparaśabdavācyatāvirodhāt, tathaivāvigānena 
vyavahāradarśanāt, tadaniṣṭau tallopaprasaṅgāt/ tasmāt sarvadhvanayo yogyatayā 
saravārthavācakā, deśakṣayopaśamādyapekṣayā tu kvacit kathañcit pratītiṃ janayanti/ .../ 
ato 'mī śabdādayo yadetaretarābhimataśabdārthopekṣayā svābhimataṃ śabdārthaṃ 
darśayanti, tadā nayās, tasyāpi tatra bhāvāt/ parasparabādhayā pravartamānāḥ punar 
durnayarūpatāṃ bhajanti, nirālambanatvād iti/ 
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intended word meaning in disregard of all other intended word meanings, 
because also that intended meaning is present in the word. When they 
proceed to obstruct other standpoints, on the other hand, they are defective 
standpoints, without basis. 
 
Showing that Mahāvīra had taught in the root language did not therefore solve all 
problems, and the Digambara Jainas appear to have been aware of this. Even if 
the language in which the tīrthaṅkara taught was the root language, the one 
closest to reality and the one from which all other languages are derived through 
a process of corruption, this does not change the fact that this teaching might be 
suspected of having been thought out and formulated in a mind, and had then 
inevitably been polluted in the process. What is more, by being couched in 
language, any language, it could not possibly convey the highest truth. 
 Both these problems could be solved, and at least certain Digambara 
Jainas tried to do so. The pollution that accompanies all teaching that emanates 
from a mind could be undone by maintaining that Mahāvīra’s teaching was not 
produced in or by a mind. And the incapacity for language to convey the highest 
truth could be avoided by maintaining that Mahāvīra had not used language. This, 
I propose, would be the reason why certain Digambaras opted for a divine sound 
that did not have the form of a language, but that could be turned into language by 
the gaṇadharas, not without loosing its pristine perfection. 
 Are there texts that speak about this non-linguistic divine sound? Not all 
the texts referred to in the Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa are accessible to me, and the 
quotes from those texts given in that encyclopedia are not always long enough, or 
clear enough, to determine the position of their authors. Let me therefore limit 
myself to some few passages. 
 An early text that mentions the divyadhvani (Prakrit divvajhuṇī) is the 
Tiloyapaṇṇatti (Skt. Trilokaprajñapti). This text was known to the author of the 
Dhavalā, which dates from around 800 CE;17 the Tiloyapaṇṇatti must therefore be 
earlier than this.18 We read here:19 
 
When infinite knowledge has arisen and veiled knowledge has been 
destroyed, a divine sound (divvajhuṇī) that concerns the ninefold objects 
expresses the meaning of the Sūtras. 
 
And again:20 
                                                
17 This text “was completed by Virasena on the 13th day of the bright fortnight of Karttika 
in the year 738 of the Saka era, when Jagattunga (i.e. Govinda III of the Rashtrakuta 
dynasty) had abandoned the throne and Boddana Raya (probably Amoghavarsha I) was 
ruling. … the date corresponds … to the 8th October 816 A.D., Wednesday morning.” 
(Introduction to the edition, p. ii.) 
18 Premī 1942: 7; see further the Hindi introduction to the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, p. 48. 
19 Tiloyapaṇṇatti 1.74 (Jīvarāja Granthamālā, Śolāpura, Vi. Saṃ. 1999), as quoted in the 
Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa (II, p. 430-431): jāde aṇaṃtaṇāṇe ṇaṭṭhe chadumaṭṭhidiyammi 
ṇāṇammi/ ṇavavihapadatthasārā divvajhuṇī kahai suttatthaṃ/ 
20 Tiloyapaṇṇatti 4.903-904 (as above): ... akkhalio saṃjhattidaya ṇavamuhuttāṇi/ 
ṇissaradi ṇiruvamāṇo divvajhuṇī jāva joyaṇayaṃ/ sesesuṃ samaesuṃ 
gaṇaharadeviṃdacakkavaṭṭīṇaṃ/ paṇhāṇuruvam atthaṃ divvajhuṇī ... 
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For nine moments (muhūrta)21 an uninterrupted and incomparable divine 
sound comes forth reaching up to a yojana during the three sandhyās (i.e., 
morning, noon, and evening). At other times the divine sound expresses 
meaning in accordance with questions of gaṇadharas, the king of the gods, 
and of world rulers. 
 
Also a passage from Nemicandra's Gommaṭasāra,22 a work composed toward the 
end of the tenth century CE, states in essence the same as the last passage from 
the Tiloyapaṇṇatti. 
 These passages seem to indicate that at least certain early Digambara texts 
accept the notion of a divine sound as described by Jaini. But others, as we have 
seen, don't. It will be interesting to see what the Vīrasena's Dhavalā, a 
commentary on the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, the oldest surviving canonical text of the 
Digambara Jainas, has to say about the matter. We have already seen that the 
Dhavalā dates from around 800 CE. As is clear from the following passage, the 
Dhavalā is concerned to show that an omniscient kevalin, even though in the 
possession of a mind, does not use it to acquire his omniscience:23 
 
[Opponent:] Because they have a mind, also omniscient saints (kevalin) 
must be in the possession of conceptual awareness. 
[Proponent:] No. Because the [omniscient saints], once their veils of 
ignorance have been destroyed, have no conceptual awareness since, by 
force of stopping the mind, they do not grasp external objects [in that 
manner]. 
[Opponent:] In that case omniscient saints must be without conceptual 
awareness. 
                                                
21 It is hard to believe that a muhūrta here covers 48 minutes, since in that case three 
times nine muhūrtas would almost fill 24 hours. 
22 Cited in the Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa. The name of this text is sometimes misprinted: 
the Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa itself uses Gommaṭasāra and Gomaṭṭasāra in its Saṃketa-
Sūcī; the volume on Jain Philosophy, part I of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies 
has Gomatasāra and Gommatasāra (Malvania & Soni 2007: 604-605). On Gommaṭa as 
pet name of Cāmuṇḍarāya, see Jain 1981: 40-41. 
23 Dhavalā on sūtra 1.1.173, p. 411 l. 1-6: samanaskatvāt sayogakevelino ’pi saṃjñina iti 
cen na, teṣāṃ kṣīṇāvaraṇānāṃ mano’vaṣṭambhabalena bāhyārthagrahaṇābhāvatas 
tadasattvāt/ tarhi bhavantu kevalino ’saṃjñina iti cen na, sākṣātkṛtāśeṣapadārthānām 
asaṃjñitvavirodhāt/ asaṃjñinaḥ kevalino mano ’napekṣya bāhyārthagrahaṇād 
vikalendriyavad iti ced bhavaty evaṃ yadi mano ’napekṣya saṃjñitvam ucyate/ kiṃ punar 
asaṃjñitvasya nibandhanam iti cet? manaso ’bhāvād buddhyatiśayābhāvaḥ/. See also 
Dhavalā on sūtra 1.1.122, p. 369 l. 7-9: atha syān nārhataḥ kevalajñānam asti tatra 
noindriyāvarāṇakṣayopaśamajanitamanasaḥ sattvāt, na, prakṣīṇasamastāvaraṇe 
bhagavaty arhati jñānāvaraṇakṣayopaśamābhāvāt tatkāryasya manaso 'sattvāt. 
"[Opponent:] An arhat does not have perfect knowledge, because he has a mind that is 
produced by the annihilation and subsidence of the veil of the quasi-senses. [Proponent:] 
This is not correct, because there is no annihilation and subsidence of the veil of 
knowledge in a revered arhat all of whose veils have been destroyed, and its effect, the 
mind, is therefore not there." 
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[Proponent:] No. Because it would be a contradiction to say that beings 
that have immediate access to all things are without conceptual awareness. 
[Opponent:] Omniscient saints are without conceptual awareness because 
they grasp external things independently of the mind, just like people 
whose sense organs are defective. 
[Proponent:] It is like that if you use the expression “absence of conceptual 
awareness” based on the mere arising of knowledge independently of the 
mind. 
[Opponent:] What then is the basis of absence of conceptual awareness? 
[Proponent:] The absence of clear consciousness resulting from the 
absence of mind. 
 
Speech has no need for a mind. It results directly from knowledge:24 
 
[Opponent:] If there is no mind, then speech, its effect, is not there either. 
[Proponent:] This is not correct, for speech is the effect of knowledge 
(rather than of mind). 
 
Mahāvīra, the Dhavalā states elsewhere, possesses an exceedingly sweet, 
agreeable, deep and clear voice, having the form of the languages of animals, 
gods and humans, including the eighteen major languages and seven hundred bad 
languages, present far away and nearby within a distance of a yojana, and devoid 
of shortcomings and extras.25 
 The Dhavalā also states the following:26 
 
                                                
24 Dhavalā on sūtra 1.1.122, p. 370 l. 3-4: tatra manaso 'bhāve tatkāryasya vacaso 'pi na 
sattvam iti cen na, tasya jñānakāryatvāt. 
25 Dhavalā on 1.1.1, p. 62 l. 1-6: yojanāntaradūrasamīpasthāṣṭādaśabhāṣā-
saptahataśatakubhāṣāyuta-tiryagdevamanuṣyabhāṣākāra-
nyūnādhikabhāvātītamadhuramanoharagambhīraviśadavāgatiśayasampannaḥ ... 
mahāvīro 'rthakartā. See also Dhavalā on 4.1.8, vol. 9 p. 62 l. 3 (as quoted in the 
Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa): 
(a?)saṃkhejjaguṇabhāsāsaṃbhalidatitthayaravayaṇaviṇiggayajjhuṇi. 
26 Dhavalā on 1.1.50, p. 285 l. 7 – p. 287 l. 4: kim iti kevalino vacanaṃ 
saṃśayānadhyavasāyajanakam iti cen na, svārthānantyāc chrotur 
āvaraṇakṣayopaśamātiśayābhāvāt/ tīrthakaravacanam anakṣaratvād dhvanirūpam, tata 
eva tad ekam/ ekatvān na tasya dvaividhyaṃ ghaṭata iti cen na, tatra syād ityādi 
asatyamoṣavacanasattvatas tasya dhvaner anakṣaratvāsiddheḥ/ sākṣaratve ca 
pratiniyataikabhāṣātmakam eva tadvacanaṃ nāśeṣabhāṣārūpaṃ bhaved iti cen na, 
kramaviśiṣṭavarṇātmakabhūyaḥpaṅktikadambakasya pratiprāṇipravṛttasya dhvaner 
aśeṣabhāṣārūpatvāvirodhāt/ tathā ca kathaṃ tasya dhvanitvam iti cen na, 
etadbhāṣārūpam eveti nirdeṣṭum aśakyatvataḥ tasya dhvanitvasiddheḥ/ atīndriyajñāntvān 
na kevalino mana iti cen na, dravyamanasaḥ sattvāt/ bhavatu dravyamanasaḥ sattvaṃ na 
tatkāryam iti ced bhavatu tatkāryasya kṣāyopaśamikajñānasyābhāvaḥ, api tu tadutpādane 
prayatno 'sty eva, tasya pratibandhakatvābhāvāt/ tenātmano yogaḥ manoyogaḥ/ 
vidyamāno 'pi tadutpādane prayatnaḥ kim iti svakāryaṃ na vidadhyād iti cen na, 
tatsahakārikāraṇakṣayopaśamābhāvāt/ asato manasaḥ kathaṃ vacanadvitayasamutpattir 
iti cen na, upacāratas tayos tataḥ samutpattividhānāt/ 
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[Opponent:] Can the speech of an omniscient saint produce doubt and 
indeterminate cognition? 
[Proponent:] This is not correct. The hearer [can be misled] because he has 
not completely destroyed and stopped his veils of ignorance, and the 
objects [of knowledge of the omniscient sage] are infinite in number. The 
speech of a tīrthaṅkara has the form of sound (dhvani), because it does not 
consist of syllables, and for this reason it is single. 
[Opponent:] Because it is single, it could not be of two kinds (i.e. both true 
and neither true nor false). This cannot correct, because it has not been 
established that that sound has no syllables, because the [tīrthaṅkara] uses 
speech that is neither true nor false, as when he says “it can be (syāt) [this 
or that]” and so on. And if it has syllables, that speech would constitute 
just one single language and would not have the form of all languages. 
[Proponent:] This you cannot say. For there is no contradiction in saying 
that sound — even if it is a collection of several phrases each consisting of 
sequential speech sounds, and used by different living beings — has the 
form of all languages. 
[Opponent:] In that case, why is the tīrthaṅkara’s speech called ‘sound’ 
rather than language? 
[Proponent:] Your opposition is misplaced, because it has been established 
that it is sound because it is impossible to show that it is only this or that 
particular language. 
[Opponent:] The omniscient sage does not have a mind, because his 
knowledge is beyond the senses. 
[Proponent:] That is not correct, because even a tīrthaṅkara has a physical 
mind. 
[Opponent:] He may have a physical mind, but not its effect. 
[Proponent:] It is true that he does not have its effect in the form of 
destructible and perishable knowledge. However, the effort to bring 
knowledge about is there, because that does not obstruct anything. The so-
called mind-exertion is therefore an exertion of the self. 
[Opponent:] Does this mean that the effort to bring that about, though 
present, would not effect its own effect? 
[Proponent:] No, because its accompanying causes have not been 
destroyed and stopped. 
[Opponent:] How do the two kinds of speech, true and neither true nor 
false, arise from a non-existent mind? 
[Proponent:] This question is inappropriate, because these two are only 
metaphorically made to arise from it. 
 
This passage remains rather obscure, but it does suggest that the utterances of a 
tīrthaṅkara have sequence. This is confirmed by the following passage, which 
immediately follows a statement considered above to the effect that speech, in the 
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case of an omniscient being, derives from knowledge without the intermediary of 
a mind:27 
 
[Opponent:] How can words that have sequence arise from knowledge that 
is without sequence? 
[Proponent:] It can, because we observe that a pot can sequentially come 
into being as a result of a potter who has non-sequential knowledge of the 
pot. 
 
Whatever the correct interpretation of these passages, it seems clear that Vīrasena 
the author of the Dhavalā did not think of a monotone that resembled the syllable 
oṃ. The Dhavalā does not even use the term divyadhvani in any of these passages 
to describe the utterances of an omniscient being.28 
 The few texts we have considered suggest that different Digambara 
authors had different opinions about the way the Jina had communicated his 
message. They do not all use the expression "divine sound" (divyadhvani) in this 
connection. Indeed, the divyadhvani would appear to be but one of the possible 
options, the most extreme one. But all of these authors appear to have been driven 
by the conviction that the medium used by Mahāvīra had a direct effect on the 
credibility of his message. 
 
If our reflections so far are correct, certain Jaina thinkers accepted a radical 
solution to a problem that had ultimately been introduced by Buddhists. Buddhists 
were the first to propose that language conceals rather than reveals reality. This 
being the case, why is the radical solution consisting of a divine sound that is a 
monotone a Jaina solution rather than a Buddhist one? The Buddhists, it would 
seem, were more in need of such a solution than the Jainas were. 
 It appears, as a matter of fact, that certain Buddhists had adopted a very 
similar solution. It is known by the name ekasvara and was adopted by some 
Śrāvakayāna and several Mahāyāna texts. Here is what Lamotte (1970: 1380 n.1) 
says about it:29 
 
Le Buddha a prêché la Loi de diverses manières ... et notamment par un 
son unique (ekasvareṇa) ou par une émission de voix d'un instant 
(ekakṣaṇavāgudāhareṇa). Ce son exprime la Loi dans son entier, parvient 
à tous les univers des dix régions, réjouit la pensée de tous les êtres et 
                                                
27 Dhavalā on sūtra 1.1.122, p. 370 l. 4-5: akramajñānāt kathaṃ kramavatāṃ vacanānām 
utpattir iti cen na, ghaṭaviṣayākramajñānasamavetakumbhakārād ghaṭasya 
krameṇotpattyupalambhāt. 
28 Confusingly, the Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa cites a phrase from the Dhavalā in which 
this word (or rather its Prakrit equivalent divvajjhuṇī) does appear to be used. The phrase 
supposedly occurs in the ninth volume of the Dhavalā (p. 120 l. 10, on Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama 
4.1.44), a volume that is not accessible to me. It reads: divvajjhuṇīe kimaṭṭhaṃ 
tatthāpaütto "Why does the divine sound not take place there?". The proposed Hindi 
translation (gaṇadhara kā abhāva hone se ... divyadhvani kī pravṛtti nahīṃ (hotī hai) "the 
divine sound does not take place because there are no gaṇadharas present") presumably 
provides evidence regarding the context. 
29 See further Demiéville, 1937. 
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détruit les passions. Chaque auditeur, selon sa classe et ses capacités, en 
obtient l'intellection et croit que le Buddha a prêché pour lui seul. 
 La doctrine du son unique est déjà formulée dans certaines sectes 
du Petit Véhicule. Les Vibhajyavādin produisaient une Stance d'éloge du 
Buddha (tsan fo song) citée dans la Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 79, p. 410 a 16; T 
1546, k. 41, p. 306 c 24; T 1547, k. 9, p. 482 c 16): "Le Buddha se sert 
d'un son unique pour énoncer la Loi, et les êtres alors, chacun selon sa 
catégorie, en obtiennent l'intelligence. Tous se disent: la Bhagavat parle la 
même langue que moi, c'est pour moi seul qu'il énonce tel ou tel sens". — 
Pour les Mahāsāṃghika également le Buddha énonce tous les dharma par 
un son unique (cf. Bareau, Sectes, p. 58, thèse 4). 
 Mais les Sarvāstivādin (Bareau, ibidem, p. 145, thèse 54) rejettent 
cette doctrine, et la Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 79, p. 410 b 25) fait remarquer que 
la stance précitée n'appartient pas au Tripiṭaka et en donne (p. 410 c 8-9) 
une interprétation édulcorée: "Bien que les sons du Buddha soient 
nombreux et divers, ils sont également utiles, c'est pourquoi on parle de 
son unique". 
 Les Mahāyānasūtra adoptèrent avec enthousiasme la doctrine du 
son unique. [References to Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka, Ratnakūṭa, 
Sukhāvatīvyūha, Grand Parinirvāṇa, Vimalakīrti, p. 108-110, 342.] 
 
This is not the occasion to explore in further detail the role of the monotone and 
of the momentary sound in Buddhism. It seems however more than likely that this 
peculiar notion was accepted as a solution to the same problem that also occupied 
the Jainas and led some of the latter to accept a monotone: the belief that 
language conceals rather than reveals reality, so that the teachings of the Buddha 
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